Sky Kurtz

In October 2018, the first tomatoes came off the vine inside a climate-controlled greenhouse in Nahel, a stretch of desert on the edge of Abu Dhabi. Outside, summer temperatures had been reaching forty-eight degrees Celsius for weeks. Inside, the climate control system held its set point: Mediterranean conditions sustained through the Gulf's harshest months. By the company's account, the harvest arrived two months after the facility commissioned and beat its targeted yield by twenty percent. Sky Kurtz had spent his career analyzing models in boardrooms in New York and San Francisco. He was looking, in that first harvest, at the proof that the model built in Abu Dhabi was correct.

The Man from Jerome Who Went Looking for a Different Kind of Deal

Sky Kurtz grew up in Jerome, Arizona, a former copper-mining town of fewer than five hundred people. He left for Tempe on a finance degree, graduated summa cum laude from Arizona State University's W.P. Carey School of Business, and earned the Turken Family Outstanding Graduating Senior award. He went to New York, then to San Francisco. His career in private equity ran through CCMP Capital, a generalist investment firm based in New York, and Francisco Partners, a technology-focused investment firm with an affiliation with Sequoia Capital.

He was good at evaluating companies. He was also, twice, a founder himself. Before Pure Harvest, he co-founded Vence, a virtual fencing and autonomous livestock management company, which was later sold to Merck Animal Health. He served as a divisional CEO at Pultron Composites, a building-materials company, and his division was later sold into a joint venture with Owens Corning. Each of those outcomes taught him something about the distance between a technology that works and a business that scales.

Kurtz went to Stanford's Graduate School of Business, where he studied finance and public management. It was the Stanford network, not the classroom, that produced the partnership: in 2016, through the university's alumni network in the UAE, he met Mahmoud Adi, a UAE national who had spent ten years as an investment professional at Mubadala Investment Company, covering technology, semiconductors, and metals. Adi would later found Shorooq Partners, one of Abu Dhabi's leading early-stage venture funds, and serve as the founding CEO of Hub71, the emirate's flagship startup incubator.

These two men, one from a dying mining town in Arizona and one from inside Abu Dhabi's sovereign capital apparatus, looked at the Gulf and saw the same structural fact: a region of considerable wealth that imported approximately ninety percent of its food. The UAE is eighty percent desert. It has almost no arable land in the conventional sense. Its summer temperatures make outdoor agriculture commercially unviable for most of the year. The government had been pressing to increase domestic food production, and had set a target of sourcing seventy percent of produce locally. Against that target, the country's import dependency was not a statistic. It was a mandate without a credible technology operator behind it.

The gap between what the Gulf consumed and what it could grow was the founding insight of Pure Harvest Smart Farms.

The Greenhouse That Should Not Have Worked

In late 2017, Pure Harvest Smart Farms registered with the Abu Dhabi Global Market. Kurtz, Adi, and their third co-founder, Robert Kupstas, spent their first year studying high-tech food-production systems in the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and North America. They were not inventing controlled-environment agriculture. They were identifying technology that had been proved in hostile climates and asking whether it could be re-engineered for a different kind of hostile climate.

The conviction was specific. Controlled-environment agriculture had been built at commercial scale in cold regions, where the challenge was insufficient light and heat. The Gulf's problem was the opposite: extreme heat, extreme sun, and almost no fresh water. The founders believed the engineering could be adapted. They also believed the window was narrow: no credible technology-enabled agritech company had yet built at commercial scale in the region, despite years of government urgency on the food security file.

Shorooq Partners invested $1.1 million in a pre-seed round. A further $4.5 million in seed capital followed, which Wamda at the time described as a historic raise for UAE agritech. Construction began on a pilot facility in Nahel, outside Abu Dhabi.

The risk was structural: a first-of-its-kind commercial greenhouse in one of the world's most hostile agricultural environments, with no regional proof point at this scale. The summer temperatures in Nahel were far beyond what Dutch or Scandinavian greenhouse infrastructure had been designed to sustain. The entire model depended on climate control technology holding its set point through a Gulf summer.

The company says the facility commissioned in early August 2018 and the first harvest arrived two months later, with the climate control holding. The tomatoes were red and on-vine, and by the company's account beat the yield target by twenty percent. By the company's own account, Pure Harvest became the first agribusiness in the UAE to produce commercial quantities of fresh tomatoes during the region's extreme summer climate conditions.

"I want a world where any country can invest in its own food security.". Sky Kurtz, The National

The first harvest in Nahel was the opening sentence of that argument in concrete form.

The Capital Stack Built on One Proof Point

The first harvest made Pure Harvest credible. It did not make it well-capitalized. That took another two years of operational proof-building before institutional money followed at scale.

In April 2020, the company closed a $20.6 million Series A led by Wafra International Investment Company, the Kuwait-based sovereign investment institution. Alongside the Series A, Wafra committed a further $100 million in multi-stage capital tied to Pure Harvest's regional expansion. At the time, it ranked among the largest agritech investments in the Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan region. The round brought Wafra's CEO onto Pure Harvest's board, embedding the capital and the governance in the same relationship.

The pandemic arrived the same year. Global supply chains fractured, and the Gulf's import dependency, previously a policy briefing concern, became a cabinet-level conversation in every GCC government. Kurtz observed to Arabian Business that the pandemic has really struck the cymbal, if you will, of the narrative about food security, economic diversification and sustainability. The argument Pure Harvest had been making since 2017 was now receiving the full attention of the governments and institutions the company needed to reach.

The company expanded into Saudi Arabia, planning a six-hectare farm in Riyadh and growing headcount from nineteen to ninety. Its distribution footprint across the UAE deepened. Produce reached Spinneys, Carrefour, and Waitrose shelves. The Jumeirah Group became a customer. Exports began moving into Kuwait and Oman.

In September 2020, Pure Harvest agreed with Kuwait's Sultan Center to build a dedicated eight-hectare farm in Kuwait, a $35 million project drawn from the Wafra multi-stage commitment, intended to supply the retailer year-round with tomatoes, vine crops, leafy greens, and berries.

In June 2022, Pure Harvest closed a $180.5 million convertible financing round. The investors included Metric Capital Partners from the United Kingdom, IMM Investment Corp from South Korea, and the Olayan Group from Saudi Arabia. It was one of the largest convertible financings ever completed in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia region. The company's announcements at the time put total fundraising at $387.1 million, a figure that included committed but undrawn capital. Kurtz would later tell Semafor, in September 2024, that Pure Harvest had raised $287 million since 2017. By either measure, it stood among the best-funded startups across those markets.

What Kurtz was building by this point was not solely a produce business. It was an agricultural operating platform: design, procure, construct, and operate farms, then market and distribute the harvest through established retail and hospitality channels. The climate control technology proved in Nahel had become the template for each subsequent facility, replicable across any market where hostile conditions and government motivation aligned.

In January 2024, Pure Harvest acquired the Saudi farming operations of RedSea, adding a six-hectare production facility near Riyadh and a forty-hectare land bank for future development. The company's franchise was now operational in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with exports running to Kuwait and Oman. In September 2024, Kurtz told Semafor the company had hired Rothschild & Co to raise more than $100 million for expansion into Singapore, Morocco, and Kuwait, and planned to spin its Saudi operations into a standalone entity. No close has been announced.

What the Desert Teaches About the Sequence

The portable insight from Pure Harvest is not about farming. It is about reading structural vulnerability in a wealthy market as a capital opportunity, and then being disciplined about the sequence: prove first, raise second.

The Gulf states import most of what they eat. They know this. They have sovereign wealth funds, infrastructure ambitions, and policy frameworks designed to address it. What they lacked, until Pure Harvest delivered its first harvest in October 2018, was a credible technology-enabled operator who had proved the model at commercial scale in the region. The proof point in Nahel was the founding asset. Everything that followed, the Wafra $100 million commitment, the $180.5 million convertible round, the Saudi expansion, the retail distribution, was built on that single, specific result.

Kurtz's path from Jerome, Arizona, to a greenhouse in Nahel, Abu Dhabi, ran through private equity, through two exits, through Stanford, and through a conviction that the most durable infrastructure play in the region was not a digital layer on top of existing behavior but a physical layer addressing a dependency the Gulf could not sustain indefinitely: importing nearly all of its food from somewhere else.

The sequence matters as much as the insight. Pure Harvest did not raise $180 million before proving the technology. It proved the technology on seed capital, used the proof to attract sovereign investment, and used the sovereign investment to build a regional franchise. Wafra's $100 million multi-stage commitment in 2020 was not venture capital betting on a thesis. It was an institution backing a proof point it could verify in a greenhouse in Nahel.

Kurtz said to Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week: "We're engaging every stakeholder that will listen to drive a compelling and clear narrative on how solutions like ours can be part of the future of food." The produce on the shelves at Spinneys and Waitrose across the UAE is that narrative in concrete form. The next founder looking at a Gulf market where government urgency and structural dependency align should read this carefully: the hardest environments to build in are also, once the infrastructure is in place and the retail relationships are established, the hardest to compete with. Kurtz did not build a greenhouse. By the company's own account, he built one of the first proofs that the UAE could grow its own food at commercial scale. The franchise followed the proof.